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Of Disasters and Dragon Kings: A Statistical Analysis
of Nuclear Power Incidents and Accidents
Spencer Wheatley,1,∗ Benjamin Sovacool,2,3 and Didier Sornette1
We perform a statistical study of risk in nuclear energy systems. This study provides and an-
alyzes a data set that is twice the size of the previous best data set on nuclear incidents and
accidents, comparing three measures of severity: the industry standard International Nuclear
Event Scale, the Nuclear Accident Magnitude Scale of radiation release, and cost in U.S. dol-
lars. The rate of nuclear accidents with cost above 20 MM 2013 USD, per reactor per year,
has decreased from the 1970s until the present time. Along the way, the rate dropped signif-
icantly after Chernobyl (April 1986) and is expected to be roughly stable around a level of
0.003, suggesting an average of just over one event per year across the current global fleet. The
distribution of costs appears to have changed following the Three Mile Island major accident
(March 1979). The median cost became approximately 3.5 times smaller, but an extremely
heavy tail emerged, being well described by a Pareto distribution with parameter α = 0.5–0.6.
For instance, the cost of the two largest events, Chernobyl and Fukushima (March 2011), is
equal to nearly five times the sum of the 173 other events. We also document a significant
runaway disaster regime in both radiation release and cost data, which we associate with the
“dragon-king” phenomenon. Since the major accident at Fukushima (March 2011) occurred
recently, we are unable to quantify an impact of the industry response to this disaster. Exclud-
ing such improvements, in terms of costs, our range of models suggests that there is presently
a 50% chance that (i) a Fukushima event (or larger) occurs every 60–150 years, and (ii) that
a Three Mile Island event (or larger) occurs every 10–20 years. Further—even assuming that
it is no longer possible to suffer an event more costly than Chernobyl or Fukushima—the ex-
pected annual cost and its standard error bracket the cost of a new plant. This highlights the
importance of improvements not only immediately following Fukushima, but also deeper im-
provements to effectively exclude the possibility of “dragon-king” disasters. Finally, we find
that the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) is inconsistent in terms of both cost and
radiation released. To be consistent with cost data, the Chernobyl and Fukushima disasters
would need to have between an INES level of 10 and 11, rather than the maximum of 7.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The industry-standard approach to the evalua-
tion of the risk of nuclear accidents is a top-down
technique called probabilistic safety assessment
(PSA). PSA consists of developing fault tree models
that allow one to simulate accidents, with differ-
ent triggers and event paths, and the severity and
frequency of such accidents.(1) Furthermore, within
a plant, PSA may be an ongoing process where
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both the PSA, and plant operations and technology,
evolve together with the purpose of improving plant
safety. The basic PSAmethodology works as follows.
Initiating events, such as component failures, human
errors, and external events, are enumerated and
assigned probabilities. Next, a (typically determin-
istic) fault tree is defined to encode the causal links
between events, allowing combinations of initiating
events to form the ultimate resultant/system-level
event. Such a model then allows one to determine
the probability of such events, and potentially attach
damage/consequence values to the event paths.
Thus, a textbook PSA would require the complete
and correct definition of initiating events, subse-
quent cascade effects, and their probabilities and
consequences.
It is therefore not surprising that the documen-
tation for a plant-specific PSA often fills a book-
shelf, and is a constant “work in progress.” Within
PSA, three levels exist, delineating the depth/extent
to which events are studied:(2–4) level 1 concerns
core damage events, level 2 concerns radioactive re-
leases from the reactor building given that an acci-
dent has occurred, and level 3 evaluates the impact
of such releases on the public and the environment.
Levels 1 and 2 are required by regulation. Level 3,
which is the level considered in this study, is sel-
dom done in PSA. Given that the reliability of PSA
depends on the inclusiveness of scenarios, the cor-
rect modeling of cascade effects, and the handling
of tremendous uncertainties, it is not surprising that
PSA has failed to anticipate a number of histori-
cal accidents in civil nuclear energy.(5,6) It has been
found that the probability assessments were fraught
with unrealistic assumptions,(7) severely underesti-
mating the probability of accidents. The chairman of
the World Association of Nuclear Operators stated
that the nuclear industry is overconfident when eval-
uating risk and that the severity of accidents is often
underreported.(8)
Instead of entering this quagmire, several stud-
ies have used a “bottom-up” approach, perform-
ing statistical analysis of historical data. These stud-
ies, (5,9–12) and others, have almost universally found
that PSA dramatically underestimates the risk of ac-
cidents. The International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) provides the International Nuclear Event
Scale (INES) measure of accident severity, which
is the standard scale used to measure the severity
of nuclear accidents. However, the INES has been
censured—for being crude, inconsistent, only avail-
able for a small number of events, etc.—not only
in statistical studies, but by the industry itself.(8,13)
As noted by The Guardian newspaper, it is indeed
remarkable (sic astonishing) that the IAEA does
not publish a historical database of INES events.(14)
However, given that the IAEA has the dual objec-
tive of promoting and regulating the use of nuclear
energy, one should not take the full objectivity of the
INES data for granted. Independent studies are nec-
essary to avoid possible conflicts of interest associ-
ated with misaligned incentives.
Presumably for lack of better data sources, a
number of statistical studies(11,12) have used the INES
data to make statements about both the severity and
frequency of accidents in nuclear energy systems.
Here, we also perform a statistical analysis of nu-
clear incidents and accidents, but we avoid relying
on the INES data. Instead, we use the estimated cost
value in USD (U.S. dollars) as the common metric
that allows one to compare often very different types
of events. This database has over triple the number
of events compared with most studies, providing a
much better basis for statistical analysis and infer-
ence, and bringing into question the reliability of the
other studies. Moreover, because radiation releases
may translate into very different levels and spread of
contamination of the biosphere, depending on local
circumstances, the quantification of cost is more use-
ful and provides a better comparative tool.
According to PSA specialists, the gaps between
PSA-specific results and the global statistical data
analysis mentioned above exist in the eyes of ob-
servers who ignore the limitations in scope that ap-
ply to almost all PSA—e.g., PSA is often restricted
to normal operating conditions and internal initiating
events. Indeed, PSA is a tool that serves many pur-
poses that do not rely on the accurate absolute quan-
tification of risks. However, PSA is used as the tool
for discussing risks in nuclear energy systems, and has
multiple shortcomings in this regard. That is, PSA
applications need to better consider incompleteness,
uncertainty,(6,15–17) and be combined with bottom-up
statistical approaches when discussing risks at many
levels.(18)
Moreover, because of the uniqueness of each
reactor, some nuclear experts say that assigning risk
to a particular nuclear power plant is impossible.(3,19)
A further argument is that the series of accidents
form a nonstationary series; in particular because the
industry has been continuously learning from past
accidents, implementing procedures, and upgrading
each time to fix the problem when a vulnerability
was found—especially when revealed by an accident.
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For instance:(20) the loss of criticality control in the
fast breeder reactor EBR-I (1.7MWe), which started
operation in 1951 on a test site in the Idaho desert,
led to a mandatory reactor design principle to always
provide a negative power coefficient of reactivity
when a reactor is producing power; the Windscale
accident in 1957 catalyzed the establishment of
the general concept of multiple barriers to prevent
radioactive releases; the Three Mile Island accident
in 1979 led to plant-specific full-scope control room
simulators, plant-specific PSAmodels for finding and
eliminating risks, and new sets of emergency operat-
ing instructions; the Chernobyl accident in 1987 led
to the creation of the World Association of Nuclear
Operators (WANO) through which participating op-
erators exchange lessons learned, and best practices;
the Fukushima-Daiichi accident in 2011 is pushing
toward designs that ensure heat removal without any
AC power for extended times, etc. As a consequence,
each new accident supposedly occurs at a nuclear
plant that is not exactly the same as for the previous
accident. This leads to the concept that nuclear risks
are unknowable because one does not have a fixed
reference frame to establish reliable statistics.(21)
In contrast, we propose that it is appropriate—
and important—to study the global risk of nuclear
energy systems by performing statistical analysis of
an independently compiled data set of the global
pool of reactors. There is nothing invalid about mod-
eling the overall risk of the heterogeneous global
fleet, provided one takes sufficient care to control for
nonstationarity, and does not draw inference beyond
the “average reactor.” In particular, risk-theoretic
stochastic models aiming at describing both the fre-
quency and severity of events, as already used in
some studies,(5,9) offer very useful guidelines for such
statistical analyses. This constitutes the standard ap-
proach that insurance companies rely upon when
quoting prices to cover the risk of their clients, even
when the estimation of risk appears very difficult and
nonstationary. In this spirit, Burgherr et al.(22) write
that “the comparative assessment of accident risks is
a key component in a holistic evaluation of energy
security aspects and sustainability performance asso-
ciated with our current and future energy system.”
In the next section, we describe the data used in
our analyses, how severity of events in nuclear en-
ergy systems can be measured, and show that the
INES values are a poor measure of severity when
compared with the consequences of events measured
in USD cost. Section 3 discusses uncertainty quantifi-
cation in nuclear risks. Section 4 estimates the rate
of events, and proposes simple models to account for
the evolution of the nuclear plant industry. Section 5
analyzes the distribution of costs. Section 6 discusses
a runaway disaster effect, where the largest events
are outliers referred to as “dragon kings” (DK). Sec-
tion 7 combines the different empirical analyses of
previous sections on the rate of events, the severity
distribution, and the identification of the DK regime,
to model the total future cost distribution, and to
determine the expected annual cost. Section 8 con-
cludes and discusses policy implications.
2. DATA AND THEMEASUREMENT
OF EVENT SEVERITY
We define an “event” as an incident or accident
within the nuclear energy system that had material
relevance to safety, caused property damage, or
resulted in human harm. The nuclear energy system
includes nuclear power plants, as well as the facilities
used in its fuel cycle (uranium mines, transportation
by truck or pipeline, enrichment facilities, manu-
facturing plants, disposal facilities, etc.). Events are
defined to be independent in the sense that one event
does not trigger another one. For instance, three re-
actors melted down at Fukushima in 2011; however,
we define this as a single accident due to the fact that
the occurrences at the individual reactors were part
of a dependent sequence, and linked to a common
cause. Statistical changes due to industry responses
to past accidents are controlled for in the modeling.
With this definition, we compiled an original
database of as many events as possible over the
period 1950 to 2014. To be included in the database,
an accident had to be verified by a published source,
some of them reported in the peer-reviewed lit-
erature, but others coming from press releases,
project documents, public utility commission filings,
reports, and newspaper articles. Such an incremental
approach to database building has been widely uti-
lized in the peer-reviewed energy studies literature.
Hirschberg et al. have constructed the ENergy-
related Severe Accidents Database (ENSAD), the
most comprehensive database worldwide covering
accidents in the energy sector.(23) Flyvbjerg et al.
built their own sample of 258 transportation infras-
tructure projects worth about 90 billion USD.(24,25)
Ansar et al. (26) built their own database of 45 large
dams in 65 different countries to assess cost overruns.
Also investigating cost overruns, Sovacool et al. (27,28)
compiled a database consisting of 401 electricity
projects built between 1936 and 2014 in 57 countries,
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which constituted 325,515 megawatts (MW) of in-
stalled capacity and 8,495 kilometers of transmission
lines.
The data set includes three different measures
of accident severity: the industry standard measure,
INES; a logarithmic measure of radiation release,
NAMS (Nuclear Accident Magnitude Scale);(10) and
the consequences of accidents measured in 2013 U.S.
dollars (USD). The industry standard measure is the
discrete seven-point INES, defined as:(29) level 0:
events without safety significance, level 1: anomaly,
level 2: incident, level 3: serious incident, level 4: ac-
cident with local consequences, level 5: accident with
wider consequences, level 6: serious accident, and
level 7: major accident. Levels 1–3 are considered to
be “incidents,” and levels 4–7 “accidents.” The dis-
tinction between incidents and accidents is not clear,
and thus somewhat arbitrary (e.g., see page 152 of
the INES user manual(29)). Incidents tend to concern
degradation of safety systems, and may extend to in-
clude events where radiation was released and peo-
ple were impacted. However, when the damage and
impact to people and the environment becomes large
enough, then the event is deemed an “accident.” But,
there are rules about how many fatalities, or how
much radiation release, is necessary to qualify for a
specific INES level.
The second measure, NAMS, was proposed as
an objective and continuous alternative to INES.(10)
The NAMS magnitude is M = log10(20R) where R is
the amount of radiation released in terabecquerels.
The constant 20 makes NAMS approximately match
INES in terms of its radiation level definitions.
Finally, the main measure used here is the USD
consequences/costs due to an event. This cost mea-
sure is intended to encompass total economic losses,
such as destruction of property, emergency response,
environmental remediation, evacuation, lost product,
fines, court and insurance claims, etc. In the case
where there was a loss of life, we added a lost “value
of statistical life” of 6MMUSD per death. The 6MM
USD figure is chosen as a lower bound of the value
of statistical life reported by various U.S. agencies
(e.g., the Environmental Protection Agency, Food
and Drug Administration, Transportation Depart-
ment, etc.).(30) Practically speaking, given that the
costs are taken from different sources, it is unlikely
that the data truly reflect all relevant costs. While im-
perfect and controversial, this has the advantage of
leading to a single USD metric associated to each
event that combines all possible negative effects of
the accidents. The costs were standardized by using
historical currency exchange rates, and adjusting for
inflation to 2013 USD. Adjusting for differing price
levels (e.g., because an equivalent event in Switzer-
land will cost more than one in the Ukraine) was not
done because the majority of events belong to coun-
tries with a similar price level (the United States, the
United Kingdom, Japan, and Western Europe), and
because the sample is so heavy tailed that adjusting
cost within an order of magnitude has little impact
on the statistics.
The result of this effort is a unique data set
containing 216 events. Of these events 175 have cost
values, 104 have INES values, and 33 have NAMS
values.(10) The data sets of Sovacool from the energy
studies literature (e.g., a data set(31) has been studied
(5,9)) provided a starting point of around 100 events
with cost values. For our data set, Table I lists the 15
most costly events. The data and severity measures
are discussed in the following subsection. The data
set has been published online,(32) where the public
is encouraged to review and recommend additions
and modifications, with the intention of continually
expanding and improving the quality of the data.
We believe that this is very important for the proper
understanding of risk in nuclear energy. The cost
and INES scores are plotted over time in Fig. 1. The
frequency with which events exceed the threshold of
20MM USD, and the distribution of these excesses,
will be studied in Sections 4 and 5, respectively.
Further, how these quantities have changed in re-
sponse to the major accidents of Three Mile Island,
1979, and Chernobyl, 1986, will be studied. There
are likely to be changes following the major accident
at Fukushima in 2011. However, there has been little
time to observe improvements, and the cost data are
most incomplete in this area: the cost of 18 of the 29
post-Fukushima events contained in the data set are,
as of yet, unknown. Thus, the industry response to
Fukushima cannot be quantified in this study.
This data set dwarfs existing data sets from the
academic literature, and is mature enough to justify
an analysis. However, it is still important to consider
the quality of the data, and what methodology is best
to handle the limitations. Regarding data complete-
ness, in a rare statistical statement, the IAEA stated:
“During the period July 1995–June 1996, the Agency
received and disseminated information relating to 73
events—64 at NPPs [nuclear power plants] and nine
at other nuclear facilities. Of those 73 events, 32 were
stated to be ‘below scale’ (i.e., safety-relevant but of
no safety significance) and three to be ‘out of scale’
(i.e., of no safety relevance). Of the remaining 38
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Table I. The 15 Largest Cost Events Since 1960 Are Provided with the Date, Location, Cost in MM 2013USD, INES Value, and
NAMS Value
Date Location Cost (MM USD) INES NAMS
1986-04-26 Chernobyl, Ukraine 259,336 7 8.0
2011-03-11 Fukushima, Japan 166,089 7 7.5
1995-12-08 Tsuruga, Japan 15,500 – –
1979-03-28 TMI, Pennsylvania, United States USA 10,910 5 7.9
1977-01-01 Beloyarsk, USSR 3,500 5 –
1969-10-12 Sellafield, UK 2,500 4 2.3
1985-03-09 Athens, Alabama, USA 2,114 – –
1977-02-22 Jaslovske Bohunice, Czechoslovakia 1,965 4 –
1968-05-01 Sellafield, UK 1,900 4 4.0
1971-03-19 Sellafield, UK 1,330 3 3.2
1986-04-11 Plymouth, Massachusetts, USA 1,157 – –
1967-05-01 Chapelcross, UK 1,100 4 –
1982-09-09 Chernobyl, Ukraine 1,100 5 –
1983-08-01 Pickering, Canada 1,000 – –
1973-09-26 Sellafield, UK 990 4 2.0
Notes: The full data set is provided online.(32) Unknown values are indicated with a dash.
Fig. 1. Figures concerning the raw data. Panel I plots the cost of events over time. The horizontal line is the 20 MMUSD cutoff. The vertical
lines indicate the occurrence times of TMI, Chernobyl, and Fukushima. Panel II plots the INES scores of events over time. The vertical
lines again indicate the occurrence times of TMI, Chernobyl, and Fukushima. Panel III is a scatterplot of the INES scores and cost of events
(black), and the INES scores and NAMS values of events (gray). The star and black vertical lines give the mean and standard errors of the
logarithmic costs. The points have been shuffled (horizontally) around their integer INES score for visibility.
events, three were rated at INES level 3 and eight
at level 2 (i.e., as ‘incidents’), and 27 at level 1 (i.e.,
as ‘anomalies’).”(33) On the other hand, in the data
set of this study, only six events fall within this pe-
riod, none of whose INES values are known, rather
than the 38. This statistic tells two important things.
First, for increasingly small event sizes, our data are
increasingly incomplete—the smaller the event, the
less likely it is to be discovered, recorded, reported
to the regulator, reported in the media, etc. Second,
our data will remain incomplete for small events until
the IAEA publishes historical INES data. The short-
age of events of INES level 1, and even 2, prohibits a
“near miss” analysis. That is, given that every event
develops from having INES score 0, then to 1, and so
on, it would be interesting to determine the probabil-
ity of developing to the next level.
However, the statistics of the largest costs are
much more interesting. For instance, the most costly
event (Chernobyl) has cost roughly equal to the
sum of all other events together, the two most
costly events (Chernobyl and Fukushima) have cost
roughly five times the sum of all other events to-
gether, and the sum of the 53 costs in excess of
100 MMUSD is 99.4% of the total cost of all 175 cost
values. This clearly implies that, if one wants to study
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the aggregate risk in terms of total cost, then one
simply needs data for the largest events. Thus a typ-
ical approach taken in such cases is to study events
that are in excess of a threshold, above which the
data are thought to be reliable and well modeled.
As in a former study by Hofert,(9) we use a thresh-
old of 20MM USD, although results will be simi-
lar if a threshold of, e.g., 100 MM were used. For
cost, there are 101 values above the threshold of 20
MM. Further, of the 41 events with unknown cost, 31
have known INES scores, of which half are level 2 or
higher.
2.1. Comparing Severity Measures and
Critiquing INES
There are many ways to quantify the size of
a nuclear accident. Following Chernobyl, several
authors proposed to use a monetary value of severity
to make events comparable, and use a rate measure,
normalized by the number of reactor operating
years, to consider frequency.(34–36) This is what we
have done. Since the IAEA uses INES, it is instruc-
tive to compare the two approaches. First, the INES
is a discrete scale between 1 (anomaly) and 7 (major
accident). Similarly to the Mercalli intensity scale for
earthquakes (which has 12 levels from I [not felt])
to XII [total destruction]), each level in the INES is
intended to roughly correspond to an order of magni-
tude in severity (in the amount of radiation released).
The INES has been criticized.(10) Common
criticisms include that the evaluation of INES values
is not objective and may be misused as a public
relations (propaganda) tool; moreover, the historical
scores are not published, not all events have INES
values assigned, no estimate of risk frequency is
provided, and so on. Given confusion over the INES
scoring of the Fukushima disaster, nuclear experts
have stated that the “INES emergency scale is very
likely to be revisited.”(13) The Nuclear Accident
Magnitude Scale (NAMS),(10) a logarithmic mea-
sure of the radiation release, was proposed as an
objective and continuous alternative to INES. This
proposition, to go from the INES to the NAMS,
is reminiscent of when the geophysics discipline
replaced the discrete Mercalli intensity scale by
the continuous Richter scale with no upper limit,
which is also based on the logarithm of energy
radiated by earthquakes. In the earthquake case,
the Mercalli scale was invented more than 100
years ago as an attempt to quantify earthquake
sizes in the absence of reliable seismometers. As
technology evolved, the cumbersome and subjective
Mercalli scale was progressively replaced by the
physically-based Richter scale. In contrast, the INES
scale looks somewhat backward from a technical
and instrumental point of view, but was created in
1990 by the International Atomic Energy Agency
as an effort to facilitate consistent communication
on the safety significance of nuclear and radiolog-
ical events, while more quantitative measures are
available.
Here, we perform a statistical back-test of the
accuracy of INES values, in relation to costs and
NAMS. Indeed, INES is not defined in terms of cost;
however, if INES fails to capture the information that
costs do, then the cost measure is important. In Fig. 1,
we plot both the logarithm of cost, and NAMS versus
INES. There is an approximate linear relationship
between INES and log cost (intercept parameter at
INES = 0 is 0.64 [0.3] and slope 0.43 [0.08] by linear
regression). This is consistent with the concept that
each INES increment should correspond to an order
of magnitude in severity. However, cost grows ap-
proximately exponentially (100.43 ≈ e1) rather than
in multiples of 10 with each INES level. Further,
the upper category (7) clearly contains events too
large to be consistent with the linear relationship. For
instance, the largest events (Fukushima and Cher-
nobyl) would need to have an INES score of 10.6
to coincide with the fitted line. In addition, the cost
of INES level 3 events does not appear to be statis-
tically different from the sizes of INES level 4. Fi-
nally, there is considerable uncertainty in the INES
scores, as shown by the overlapping costs. There is an
approximate linear relationship between INES and
NAMS (at INES = 3 the intercept is 1.8 [0.9] and
slope 1.7 [0.2] by linear regression). One sees from
the points, and from the fact that the slope of the line
is greater than 1, that large radiation release events
have been given an INES level that is too small. Fur-
thermore, some INES level 3 events should be INES
level 2. This illustrates the presence of significant in-
consistency of INES scores, in terms of radiation re-
lease level definitions.
2.2. The Current Fleet of Reactors
One must judge the number of accidents relative
to the so-called volume of exposure; in this case, the
number of reactors in operation. These data were
taken from the industry data set(37) and are plotted in
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Fig. 2. Figures concerning the rate of events. Panel I: The number of operational reactors over time(37) where the bottom layer is the
United States, the second layer is Western Europe, the third layer is Eastern Europe, and the top layer is Asia. Panel II: The annual
observed frequencies are given by the solid dots, with Poisson standard errors given by the vertical gray lines (Var(λt ) = λtvt ). The solid
irregular line bounded by dotted lines is the running rate estimate (Equation (1)) from 1970 onwards, with standard errors. The solid black
lines are the Poisson GLM regressions (Equation (2)) from 1970 to 1986 and 1987 to 2014, with parameters in Table II. Panel III provides
the running rate estimate (Equation (1)) running both backwards and forwards from the Chernobyl event in 1987. In all three panels the
vertical dotted lines indicate the occurrence of the TMI, Chernobyl, and Fukushima events.
Panel I of Fig. 2. The number of reactors in operation
grew sharply until 1990, after which it stabilized. The
stable level has been supported by growth in Asia,
compensating for a decline in Western Europe. A
steep drop is observed in the Asian volume where,
following Fukushima in 2011, all of Japan’s reactors
were shut down temporarily, until further notice.(38)
On the topic of reactors, it is important to note
that reactors are somewhat informally classified into
generations:(39) Generation I reactors were early
prototypes from the 1940s to 1960s. Generation II
reactors were developed and built from the 1960s
to the 1990s, of which boiling water reactors (BWR)
and pressurized water reactors (PWR) are common.
Generation III reactors have been developed since
the 1990s. These reactors, such as the advanced
BWR and PWR reactors, were improvements upon
their Generation II ancestors, replacing safety
features that required power with passive ones, and
having more efficient fuel consumption. Generation
IV reactors concern new technologies, and are
still being researched/developed. They have the
intention of further improving safety and efficiency,
which were deemed as still being inadequate in the
Generation III reactors. The vast majority of existing
reactors are of Generation II, where most Genera-
tion I reactors have been decommissioned, and few
Generation III reactors have been constructed. Gen-
eration IV reactors are not expected to be deployed
commercially until at least 2030 or even 2040.
3. UNCERTAINTY QUANTIFICATION OF
RISKS IN NUCLEAR ENERGY SYSTEMS
Prior to moving ahead with data analysis and in-
terpretation, reflection on the degree of uncertainty
present, and how it is handled in the analysis, is
warranted. Following Aven(40) two important ques-
tions are (i) if (frequentist or Bayesian) probabilities
are attainable, and (ii) if the proposed probabilistic
model is accurate/valid. Given a lack of relevant data
(e.g., when talking about the future), or difficulty
with justifying models, the answer to these questions
may be no. If the answer to both questions is no, then
one can be said to be in a state of deep uncertainty.
Such considerations are relevant to the study of risk
in nuclear energy systems, and are discussed below.
Fortunately for this study, the context is clear, as
historical risks, and the current risk level, are being
analyzed. Future risk is only being discussed insofar
as the current state remains. Thus, the analysis does
not need to deal with uncertain futures. Also, by
studying risk at a global level, one avoids epistemic
uncertainties associated with the specificities of a
given plant, type of accident, or technology. Fur-
thermore, relevant data are available and a simple
and somewhat justifiable model used. Thus, here a
probabilistic approach is valid, where uncertainties
include epistemic model uncertainty and aleatoric
statistical uncertainty in the parameter estimates, as
well as data uncertainty. The epistemic and aleatoric
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uncertainties are dealt with by imposing a relatively
broad range of parameter estimates (for frequency,
severity distribution, and maximum possible sever-
ity). Regarding data uncertainty, the data studied
here are at a much higher quality level than those
of previous studies on nuclear risks. Although the
authors are committed to ongoing expansion and
refinement of the data, this is a sensible point to pro-
vide an analysis. That is, it is unlikely that reasonable
modifications of the cost estimates will substantially
impact the high-level results provided.
Going beyond this analysis, one can look deeper
into nuclear risk. For instance, as regulation requires,
PSA is done for each individual plant.(2,3) This ne-
cessitates that the probabilities of initiating events
be specified and that the interaction of events be en-
coded in a fault tree. Further, if one wants to perform
level 3 PSA, then the consequences of each event
need to be specified.(4) For this task, at a unique
power plant, there is little data and thus the huge
number of parameters must be specified based on
belief/assumption rather than frequentist estimates.
Thus, in addition to the aleatoric sampling uncer-
tainty that is captured by simulating from the model,
one should also consider the epistemic uncertainty in
the model specification and its parameters.(17,41) Such
an approach has been suggested(16) and a research
project considering such methodology in studying
the risk of a large loss of coolant is underway.(42)
However, standard PSA practice and regulations
are not yet at this level of uncertainty quantification.
Furthermore, needing to encode all possible events
in the fault tree implies that the worst case is limited
to the one that the modeler can imagine. Finally,
the epistemic uncertainty present in the specification
of the (typically deterministic) fault tree, which will
practically always be incomplete, is not considered at
all. These data and epistemological limitations imply
that PSA exhibits deep uncertainty. These issues
largely inhibit the ability of standard PSA to provide
an adequate quantification of overall risk.
Nonetheless, PSA is an important and useful
exercise. That is, it is a top-down technique that
allows for the generation and prioritization of
high-risk events that may not have been observed,
and for common causes to be identified. It is thus
instrumental in safety improvement, and risk-
informed decision making. The statistical approach
is a bottom-up technique, whose specificity (e.g., the
risk of a specific reactor technology) is restricted by
limited historical data, and whose instances from
which one can learn are limited to those that have
been observed. It is natural to combine top-down
and bottom-up approaches,(18) at least by comparing
their results. It is clear that this should be done in
nuclear energy systems as well.
Taking a broader perspective, the future risk of
nuclear energy should be considered to support deci-
sion making, both within the nuclear energy industry,
but also within the portfolio of energy source alter-
natives. The future risk of nuclear energy is deeply
uncertain: it depends heavily on developments in
reactor and disposal technology, plant build-out and
decommissioning scenarios, the emerging risk of
cyber-threats and attacks, etc. Furthermore, in
making decisions about the holistic plans for future
energy systems, the uncertainties of other energy
sources also become relevant across multiple cri-
teria. Many risks are reasonably well understood,
such as reduced life expectancy, but the evaluation
of terrorist threats,(43) and the potentially severe
environmental impacts of carbon emission, are
deeply uncertain.(44,45) Thus, energy system decisions
should be supported by robust multiple criteria
decision-making tools with adequate consideration
of uncertainty. A probabilistic attempt could be
scenario analysis with probability distributions being
assigned to the scenarios. Alternatively, nonproba-
bilistic methods may be warranted, as has been done
in large-scale engineering systems with multiple
diverse stakeholders.(46)
4. EVENT FREQUENCY
Regarding the frequency of events, we
observe Nt = 0, 1, 2, . . . events each year for
the vt nuclear reactors in operation for years
t = 1960, 1961, . . . , 2014. The annual observed fre-
quencies of accidents per operating facility reactor
are λ̂t = Ntvt . The observed frequencies are plotted in
Panel II of Fig. 2. The rate of events has decreased,
and perhaps stabilized since the end of the 1980s.
The running rate estimate,
λ̂RUNt0,t1 =
t1∑
t=t0
Nt
t1∑
t=t0
vt
, (1)
used by Hofert(9) is plotted for t0 = 1970 and t1 =
1970, 1971, . . . , 2014. In the presence of a decreas-
ing rate of events, such a running estimate overes-
timates the rate of events for recent times. Further-
more, it is a smoothing method where the estimate
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Table II. Parameter Estimate, Standard Error, and p-Value for
GLM Estimates of Rate (Equation (2))
Model β0 β1
GLM 1970:1986 −3.87 (0.3), 10−16 −0.06 (0.03), 0.05
GLM 1987:2014 −5.53 (0.3), 10−16 −0.015 (0.02), 0.45
Notes: The two rows are two estimates. The first starts at 1970 and
ends at 1986. The second starts and 1987 and ends at 2014. The
intercept parameter is given for at the starting time.
is taken at the right-most edge of a constantly grow-
ing smoothing window, rather than in the center of
a window with fixed width. To avoid this bias and
to properly evaluate the trend, we consider another
approach. We assume that Nt are independently dis-
tributed Pois(λtvt). The Poisson model features no
interaction between events, which is sensible as sepa-
rate nuclear events should occur independently, and
is compatible with how we have defined our events
in Section 2. The changing rate of events is accom-
modated by a log-linear model for the Poisson rate
parameter,
λGLMt = E
[
Nt
vt
]
= exp(β0 + β1(t − t0)), (2)
for given t0 < t and parameters β0, β1. This is the so-
called generalized linear model (GLM) for Poisson
counts(47) and may be estimated by maximum like-
lihood (using in R:glm). The GLM model was esti-
mated from 1970 until 1986 and from 1987 until 2014,
with estimated parameters in Table II, and plotted
in Panel II of Fig. 2. The first estimate suggests a
significantly decreasing rate, which is in agreement
with the decreasing running rate estimate. The sec-
ond (approximately flat) GLM indicates that, from
1987 onwards, the rate has been not significantly dif-
ferent from constant. Clearly, the running rate esti-
mate, starting at 1970, is unable to account for this.
To further diagnose this difference, in Panel III of
Fig. 2, the running estimate (Equation (1)) is done
running both forward and backward from the Cher-
nobyl event of 1987. From here it clear that the rate
prior to Chernobyl λ̂RUN1960,1986 = 0.013(0.002) is larger
than the rate after λ̂RUN1987,2014 = 0.0032(0.0006). Thus it
is apparent that there was a significant reduction in
the frequency of events following Chernobyl—likely
due to a comprehensive industry response.
It is interesting to note that such a change is not
apparent following TMI. There are insufficient data
to identify a change following Fukushima. That the
data are incomplete implies that our rate estimates
Table III. Statistics by Region: Number of Events (N) and
Number of Reactor Years (v) from 1980 through 2014, the Rate
of Events per Reactor Year, and the Poisson Standard Error of
the Rate
Region N v λ̂RUN1980,2014 Std.
Americas 32 4,378 0.0073 0.001
Western Europe 12 4,813 0.0027 0.001
Eastern Europe 5 2,180 0.0023 0.002
Asia 13 2,548 0.0051 0.001
Notes: Russia is included in Eastern Europe.
are underestimates. For instance, even within our
data set, there are 40 events occurring after Cher-
nobyl whose cost is unknown. Of these 40 events, 32
have INES values, and 17 of these have INES values
of 2 or larger. Based on the known INES and cost
values, the median cost of events with INES = 2 is
26 MMUSD, i.e., more than half of INES = 2 events
exceed the threshold. Thus, based on these statistics,
assuming that only nine of the 40 unknown events
have cost in excess of 20 MM USD is conservative.
With such an assumption, the estimate becomes
λ̂RUN*1987,2014 = 0.004(0.0006). Taking into account the
above, and that the rate of events may actually still
be decreasing, we consider a conservative range of
current estimates λ̂2014 between 0.0025 and 0.0035.
This suggests an average of 1 to 1.5 events per year
across the current fleet of reactors. Thus, despite
having a data set twice as big as in Hofert,(9) we find
a similar rate estimate. Further, provided that the
fleet does not undergo any major changes, we expect
the rate to remain relatively stable.
As in Hofert,(9) a significant difference between
the frequency of events across regions is found. In
Table III, one sees that the running estimate of the
annual rate varies by as much as a factor of 3 across
the regions. This is likely to be more due to a dif-
ference in reporting rather than a difference in the
true rate of events. This provides further evidence
that our rate estimates are underestimates.
5. EVENT SEVERITY
For the quantitative study of event severity, costs
(measured in MM 2013 USD) are considered to be
i.i.d. random variables Xi , i = 1, 2, . . . ,n with an un-
known distribution function F . Here, we estimate the
cost distribution. A common heavy-tailed model for
such applications is the Pareto CDF,
FP(x;u1) = 1 − (x/u1)−α, x > u1 > 0, α > 0, (3)
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which may be restricted to a truncated support as,
F(x|u1 ≤ X≤ u2) = F(x)−F(u1)F(u2)−F(u1) , 0 < u1 < u2,(4)
where u1 and u2 are lower and upper truncation
points that define the smallest and largest observa-
tions allowed under the model. Extending further,
truncated distributions may be joined together to
model different layers of magnitude,
F2P(x|u1 ≤ X) = FP(x|u1 ≤ X≤ u2)Pr{u1 ≤ X≤ u2}
+FP(x|u2 ≤ X)Pr{u2 ≤ X}. (5)
In Fig. 3, the severity measures are plotted ac-
cording to their empirical complementary cumulative
distribution functions (CCDFs). In Panel I, the sam-
ple of costs in excess of 20 MMUSD is split into pre-
and post-TMI periods, with 42 and 62 events, respec-
tively. The distributions are clearly different. Indeed,
the KS test,(48) with the null hypothesis that the data
for both subsets come from the same model, gives a
p-value of 0.015. As can be seen from the lower inset
of the first panel of Fig. 3, this p-value is much smaller
than the p-values obtained for testing other change-
times. For instance, there was no apparent change
between the pre- and post-Chernobyl periods. The
pre-1979 data, having median cost of 283 MM USD,
have a higher central tendency than the post-1979
data, having a median cost of 77MMUSD. However,
the post-1979 distribution has a heavier tail, whereas
the pre-1979 distribution decays exponentially. It is a
rather well-known observation that improved safety
and control in complex engineering systems tends to
suppress small events, but often at the expense of
more and/or larger occasional extreme events.(49–51)
This raises the question of if the observed change of
regime belongs to this class, as a result of the im-
proved technology and risk management introduced
after TMI.
Thus, we focus on estimating the left-truncated
Pareto (Equation (3)) for the post-1979 data. The
estimate α̂(u1) fluctuates in the range of 0.5–0.6 for
lower threshold 20 < u1 < 1, 000 MM USD, indi-
cating that the data are consistent with the model.
For u1 < 20, the estimate of α is smaller, as is typical
for data sets where small events are underreported.
In the former study of Sornette,(5) the estimated
value was larger (α = 0.7), while Hofert(9) also found
values between 0.6 and 0.8. With our more complete
data set, the smaller value α is qualitatively consis-
tent with previous studies, but further emphasizes
the extremely heavy tailed model (α ≤ 1) where the
mean value is mathematically infinite. In practice,
this simply means that the largest event in a given
catalog accounts for a major fraction (∼ 1 − α) of
the total dollar cost of the whole.(52) That is, the
extremes dominate the total cost.
6. RUNAWAY DISASTERS AS
“DRAGON-KING” OUTLIERS
In a complex system with safety fea-
tures/barriers, once an event surpasses a threshold,
it can become uncontrollable, and develop into a
“runaway disaster”—causing disproportionately
more damage than other events. This is the type
of phenomenon that is considered here. In Panel I
of Fig. 3 one can see that (at least) the two most
costly events since TMI (Chernobyl and Fukushima)
lay above the estimated Pareto CCDF, and that
Chernobyl, TMI, and Fukushima form a cluster of
outliers in the sample of NAMS data. The NAMS
data cannot be split into pre- and post-TMI samples
due to insufficient data. The NAMS distribution is
well described by the exponential distribution for
values between 2 until 5, as reported by Smythe.(10)
That is, for NAMS values above u1 = 3.5, the esti-
mate is α̂NAMS = 0.72(0.3) with sample size n = 15,
where the three suspected outliers were censored
to avoid biasing the estimate.(53) Since NAMS is a
logarithmic measure of radiation, this corresponds
to a Pareto distribution for the radiation released,
which is valid over three decades.
We relate this concept of runaway disasters
to the concept of DK. The term DK has been
introduced to refer to such situations where ex-
treme events appear that do not belong to the same
distribution as their smaller siblings.(49,50) DK is a
double metaphor for an event that is both extremely
large in size or impact (a “king”) and born of unique
origins (a “dragon”) relative to other events from the
same system. For instance, a DK can be generated
by a transient positive feedback mechanism. The
existence of unique dynamics of DK events gives
hope that they may be “to some extent” predictable.
In this sense, they are fundamentally different
from the a priori unpredictable “black swans.”(54,55)
Statistically speaking, given that extreme events
tend to follow heavy-tailed distributions, DK can be
specifically characterized as outlying large extremes
within the population of extreme events. That is,
DK live beyond power law tails, whereas black
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Fig. 3. Figures concerning the severity of events. Panel I: The main frame plots the cost of events for the pre- and post- TMI periods
according to their CCDFs, in gray and black, respectively. The lower inset figure shows the p-value of a segmentation test of the cost data,
identifying TMI (1979) as the change-point in the cost distribution. The upper inset figure shows the estimated parameter α (with standard
deviation) of a Pareto distribution (Equation (3)), for the post-TMI cost data, for a range of lower thresholds (u1). The fit for u1 = 30 (MM
USD) is given by the red solid line in the main frame (color visible in on-line version). Panel II: In the main frame, from left to right, are the
CCDF of INES scores above 2 (shifted left by 1), the CCDF of NAMS scores above 2, and the CCDF of the natural logarithm of post-1980
costs (shifted right by 2). For the center and right CCDFs, the dots with x marks indicate suspected outliers/dragon kings. The dashed and
solid red lines are exponential fits to the CCDFs. The inset figure provides the p-value for the outlier test for the upper sample above a
growing threshold. The upper curve is for r = 3 outliers, and the lower curve for r = 2 outliers.
swans are often thought of as being generated by
(unanticipated) heavy power law tails.
Let us now make the above observations more
rigorous by testing the apparent DK points as
statistical outliers. There are many tests available
to determine if large observations are significantly
outlying relative to the exponential (or Pareto)
distribution.(56–59) A suitable approach to assess the
NAMS outliers is by estimating a mixture of an Ex-
ponential and a Gaussian density,
fNAMS(x|x > 3.5) = παexp{−αx}
+(1 − π)φ(x;μ, σ ), α, σ > 0, (6)
where the Gaussian density φ(x;μ, σ ) provides the
outlier regime, and 0 ≤ π ≤ 1 is a weight. The test
is done for the 14 points in excess of 3.5, where
the exponential tail is valid. The maximum likeli-
hood estimation of this model (Equation (6)) is done
using an expectation maximization algorithm.(60,61)
The estimates of this (alternative) model are (π̂ =
0.8, α̂ = 0.78, μ̂ = 7.8, σ̂ = 0.21). We also consider a
null model with no DK regime (π = 1). For this the
MLE is α̂ = 0.66. The alternative model has a sig-
nificantly superior log-likelihood (the p-value of the
likelihood ratio test (62) is 0.04). Thus there is a statis-
tically significant DK regime relative to the exponen-
tial, with (1 − πˆ) · 14 ≈ 3 outliers expected.
That the amount of cost is related to the amount
of radiation released suggests testing for a DK
regime in cost. Not every runaway radiation re-
lease disaster produces commensurate financial dam-
age (see Three Mile Island in Table I). But, given
that the majority of nuclear power installations
have surrounding population densities higher than
Fukushima,(21) the DK regime in radiation should
amplify cost tail risks. From Panel II of Fig. 3 as many
as the three largest points could be outlying. For this
we consider the sum-robust-sum (SRS) test statistic,
TSRSr =
r∑
i=1
x(i)
n∑
i=r+1
x(i)
,m ≥ 1, (7)
for the ordered sample x(1) > x(2) > · · · > x(n), which
compares the sum of the outliers to the sum of the
nonoutliers.(59) This test was performed for r = 2 and
r = 3 outliers for a range of upper samples—i.e., the
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sample in excess of a growing lower threshold. For
r = 2, the p-value fluctuates between 0.05 and 0.1, for
samples ranging from the 10 to the 40 largest points.
For r = 3, the test fluctuates between 0.1 and 0.2.
Thus, there is evidence that the two largest events are
indeed outliers, both in terms of radiation and cost.
Given the suggestive evidence that the extreme
tail of cost is heavier than the rest of the tail, per-
haps due to a runaway disaster effect, it is important
to include this in the risk modeling. For simplicity,
we continue with the Pareto model. TheMLE for the
top 5 points is α̂(u1 = 1, 100) = 0.36(0.15). To pursue
a pleasant but nonrigorous argument, this appears to
be consistent with the run-away effect that propels
NAMS values from M ≈ 5 to M ≈ 8. That is, trans-
forming back from log scale, this same effect on the
Pareto model would transform the parameter α to
α(u1 = 1, 100) ≈ 58 × 0.61 = 0.375.
7. MODELING AGGREGATE ANNUAL
DAMAGE
We now characterize the annual risk of nuclear
events measured by cost, with three quantities: quan-
tiles, return periods, and expected values. These
characterizations are relevant for the current state
of the operating nuclear fleet—excluding any po-
tential improvements following Fukushima—and do
not consider scenarios for the transition to more ad-
vanced reactor technologies, such as Generation III
and beyond.
7.1. Quantiles and Return Periods
Having estimated the rate of events in Section 4,
the severity distribution in Section 5, and identified
the DK regime in Section 6, we here combine these
models in a compound Poisson process (CPP)(63) to
model the annual total cost in MM USD,
Yt =
Nt∑
i=1
Xi,t ∼ CompPois(vtλt , F), (8)
where, for each year t = 1980, 1981, . . . , 2014, there
are a random number of events Nt , modeled by a
Poisson process with annual rate vtλt , and each event
has a random size (in MM USD) Xi,t
i.i.d.∼ F, F(20) =
0, i = 1, . . . , Nt , where the condition F(20) = 0 en-
sures that we consider only events with costs larger
than 20 MMUSD.
There are a range of statistically valid parameter
estimates that should be considered. From Section 4,
rate estimates ranging between 0.025 and 0.035 were
suggested as conservative underestimates. From Sec-
tion 5, the distribution of cost in excess of 20 MM
was found to be well described by a Pareto distribu-
tion, with parameter between 0.5 and 0.6. Further, in
Section 6 it was found that the largest cost values are
significantly larger than what would be expected un-
der the Pareto model. An attempt to account for this
was made by including a heavier tail (a DK regime)
with α ≈ 0.4 for the top 10% of the mass (with lower
threshold u1 = 1, 100 MM USD).
First we characterize the risk level with return pe-
riods, defined within the CPP model by considering,
Pr
[{# events with size ≥ x( j) in τ years > 0}]
= 1 − exp [−λvτPr{X≥ x( j)}] , (9)
which is the probability of observing at least one
event, at least as large as some size (e.g., given by
an order statistic x( j)), in a given time period τ . One
sets the equation (Equation (9)) to a given prob-
ability p and solves for the return period τ j (p) of
the jth largest event. Setting p = 1 − e−1, one obtains
the standard return period τ j (p) = 1λvPr{X≥x( j)} . In
Table IV, median and quartile estimates of p = 0.5
return period estimates are given for combinations
of the above range of parameter values. For each
given set of parameter values, 100,000 samples of
the data were simulated, parameters reestimated on
these samples, and the return period computed. The
median and quartiles were taken over these 100,000
return period estimates. In the lowest risk model
(λ = 0.00275, and α = 0.6), the median p = 0.5 re-
turn periods for TMI and Fukushima are 17 and
154 years, respectively. In the most conservative case
(λ = 0.0035, and α = 0.4 in the extreme tail), these
values are 12 and 62. It is clear that including the DK
effect does not inordinately amplify the risk. For in-
stance, the return periods with high frequency risk
(λ = 0.0034) and low risk severity (α = 0.6) are sim-
ilar to those of the low frequency risk (λ = 0.00275)
and high severity risk (α = 0.4 in the extreme tail).
Next we provide quantiles. For F , we take the
estimated Pareto cost distribution (Equation (3) with
u1 = 20 and α̂ = 0.55). We also consider FDK, which
is a two-layer model (Equation (5)) where the upper
layer is for the DK regime. The first layer, from
u1 = 20 to u2 =1,100, is Pareto with α̂1 = 0.55(0.15)
estimated byMLE. The second layer, from u2 =1,100
onwards, is also Pareto with heavier tail α̂2 = 0.4.
Given vt , λt , and F , we can calculate the “aggre-
gate” distribution G for annual cost Yt . We do this
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Table IV. Median and Quartile p = 0.5 Return Periods (Equation (9)) for Fukushima (x(2)) and TMI (x(4)) for Different Rate Parameters
λ and Parameters α for the Pareto Distribution Above Lower Threshold u
λ x( j) α = 0.6, u = 20 α = 0.55, u = 20 α = 0.4, u = 1, 100
0.00275 x(2) (97,154,259) (64,98,157) (37,82,274)
0.00275 x(4) (13,17,24) (10,13,18) (10,15,30)
0.0035 x(2) (80,128,214) (50,80,130) (31,66,198)
0.0035 x(4) (10,13,19) (8,10,14) (8,12,22)
Notes: The last column corresponds to the “dragon-king” regime. The median and quartiles are computed over 100,000 estimates of the
parameter values, computed on data simulated using the parameter values provided in the table.
Table V. The Estimated 0.95 and 0.99 Quantiles, as Well as the
Probability of the Annual Cost Exceeding the Cost of Fukushima
x(2) = 166, 089 MM USD, Are Given for the Aggregate
Distribution G
Model λ q0.95 q0.99 Pr{Yt ≥ x(2)}
Pareto 0.002 2,950 54,320 0.0054
0.0025 4,440 82,440 0.0068
0.003 6,200 115,780 0.0082
Pareto DK 0.002 2,180 120,730 0.0088
0.0025 3,720 220,510 0.011
0.003 5,880 331,610 0.013
Notes: The Pareto model is with u1 = 20, α = 0.55, and the Pareto
DK model is with u1 = 20,u2 = 1, 100, α1 = 0.55, α2 = 0.4. The
volume (number of active nuclear reactors) is taken to be v2014 =
388. The quantiles are given in MM 2013 USD.
for the year 2014 with the Panjer algorithm by
Monte Carlo.(63) Quantiles of the estimated G are in
Table V. The 0.99 quantile is highly sensitive to the
choice of λ and distribution F : for very low rate
λ = 0.002, and without considering the DK effect,
the 0.99 quantile is 54,320 (MM USD), which is five
times the cost of TMI. For λ = 0.0025, we obtain a
similar estimate to Hofert,(9) who obtained 81,000
(MM USD). Considering λ = 0.003, with the DK
effect, this quantile is 331,610 (MM USD), which is
double the estimated cost of Fukushima.
7.2. Expected Annual Damage
So far we have considered models without a lim-
iting cost, in which the mean cost is mathematically
infinite, since our various estimations of the Pareto
exponent α all have values less than 1.(52) Of course,
the Earth itself is finite, thus there is an upper cut-
off, u2, to the maximum possible cost. But this upper
cutoff could be exceedingly large, and there is—as of
yet—no evidence of a maximum being reached thus
far (i.e., no accumulation of observations at an upper
limit in Fig. 3). Think, for instance, of the real-estate
value of New York City, USA or Zurich, Switzer-
land, both of which are rather close to a nuclear plant,
and would become inhabitable in a worst-case sce-
nario. Here, we would be speaking of up to tens of
trillions of dollars of financial losses, not to speak of
human ones. Thus, insurance and re-insurance com-
panies introduce a maximum loss for their liabilities,
which for them works as if there is a genuine upper
cutoff: u2. Everything above such a cutoff is then the
responsibility of the government(s) and society; for
the truly extreme catastrophes, only the state can be
the insurer of last resort.
It is useful to put hard numbers behind these con-
siderations by using scenarios. For the CPP (Equa-
tion (8)), the mean and variance of the annual cost
are:
E[Yt ] = λtvt E[X],Var(Yt) = λtvt E[X2]. (10)
Given lower and upper truncations, u1 and u2, the
first two moments for the Pareto are,
E[X] = α
α − 1
[
u1−α1 − u1−α2
u−α1 − u−α2
]
,
E[X2] = α
α − 2
[
u2−α1 − u2−α2
u−α1 − u−α2
]
. (11)
Thus the mean grows in proportion to u1−α2 (and
the variance faster as u2−α2 ). In Table VI, we com-
pute these moments of the costs X when the maxi-
mum value, u2, is equal to the present estimate of the
cost of Fukushima, 10 times greater, and 100 times
greater. Since the expected annual number of events
λ̂2014v2014 is approximately 1, these values provide a
rough estimate of the mean and standard deviation
of annual cost in 2014 (Equation (10)).
If we accept that the Fukushima or Chernobyl
events represent roughly the largest possible cost
then (see Table VI) the mean annual cost is approx-
imately 1.5 billion USD, with a standard error of 8
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Table VI. The First Moment and the Square Root of the Second
Moment of XAre Given by the First and Second Value,
Respectively
Model x(2) 10 × x(2) 100 × x(2)
Pareto 1,513, 8,253 5,367, 54,590 20,488, 349,736
Pareto DK 1,404, 8,466 3,982, 45,267 11,250, 240,810
Notes: The Pareto model is with u1 = 20, α = 0.55, and three val-
ues for the maximum value u2 given by the column labels. The
Pareto DK model is with u1 = 20,u2 = 1, 100, α1 = 0.55, α2 = 0.4
and three values for the maximum value u3. The maximum values
are 1, 10, and 100 times the cost of Fukushima, x(2) =166,089 MM
USD. All units of costs are in MM USD.
billion USD. This brackets the construction cost of
a large nuclear plant, suggesting that about one full
equivalent nuclear power plant value could be lost
each year, on average. However, the heavy tailed
severity implies that most years, there is little cost,
and once in a while an extreme hits, driving the to-
tal cost up considerably. If we assume that the largest
typical possible cost is about 10 times that of the es-
timated cost of Fukushima, then the average annual
cost is about 5.5 billion USD, with a very large dis-
persion of 55 billion USD. Indeed, the outlook is
evenmore dire for larger possible upper cutoffs. Such
numbers do not appear to be taken into account in
standard calculations on the economics of nuclear
power.(64) To be fair, we should also note that the
long-term effect on, say, lung cancer risks and other
particle pollution induced deaths, are not taken into
account in evaluating the cost-benefits of alternative
sources of energy such as coal.
8. DISCUSSION AND POLICY CONCLUSIONS
Our study makes important conclusions about
the risks of nuclear power. Regarding event fre-
quency, we have found that the rate of incidents
and accidents per civil nuclear installation decreased
from the 1970s until the present time. Along the way,
there was a significant drop in the rate of events af-
ter Chernobyl (April 1986). Since then, the rate has
been roughly stable, implying a rate between 0.0025
to 0.0035 events per reactor per year in 2015. It is
worth noting that the decrease in risk due to the re-
duced accident frequency per reactor from the 1960s
onwards has been somewhat offset by an increasing
number of reactors in operation.
Regarding event severity, we found that the
distribution of cost underwent a significant regime
change shortly after the Three Mile Island major ac-
cident. Moderate cost events were suppressed, but
extreme ones became more frequent, to the extent
that the costs are now well described by the ex-
tremely heavy tailed Pareto distribution with param-
eter α ≈ 0.55. We noted in the introduction that the
Three Mile Island accident in 1979 led to plant-
specific full-scope control room simulators, plant-
specific PSAmodels for finding and eliminating risks,
and new sets of emergency operating instructions.
The change of regime that we document here may be
the concrete embodiment of these changes catalyzed
by the TMI accident. We also identify statistically sig-
nificant runaway disaster (“dragon-king”) regimes in
both NAMS and cost, suggesting that extreme events
are amplified to values even larger than those ex-
plained under the Pareto distribution with α ≈ 0.55.
In view of the extreme risks, the need for bet-
ter bonding and liability instruments associated with
nuclear accident and incident property damage be-
comes clear. For instance, under the conservative as-
sumption that the cost from Fukushima is the maxi-
mum possible, annual accident costs are on par with
the construction costs of a single nuclear plant, with
the expected annual cost being 1.5 billion USD with
a standard deviation of 8 billion USD. If we do not
limit the maximum possible cost, then the expected
cost under the estimated Pareto model is mathemat-
ically infinite. Nuclear reactors are thus assets that
can become liabilities in a matter of hours, and it
is usually taxpayers, or society at large, that “pays”
for these accidents rather than nuclear operators or
even electricity consumers. This split of incentives
improperly aligns those most responsible for an ac-
cident (the principals) from those suffering the cost
of nuclear accidents (the agents). One policy sugges-
tion is that we start holding plant operators liable for
accident costs through an environmental or accident
bonding system,(65) which should work together with
an appropriate economic model to incentivize the op-
erators.
Third, looking to the future, our analysis sug-
gests that nuclear power has inherent safety risks
that will likely recur. With the current model—which
does not quantify improvements from the industry
response to Fukushima—in terms of costs, there is a
50% chance that (i) a Fukushima event (or larger)
occurs in 62 years, and (ii) a TMI event (or larger)
occurs in 15 years. Further, smaller but still expensive
(≥ 20 MM 2013 USD) incidents will occur with a fre-
quency of about one per year, under the assumption
of a roughly constant fleet of nuclear plants. To curb
these risks of future events would require sweeping
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changes to the industry, as perhaps triggered by
Fukushima, which include refinements to reactor op-
erator training, human factors engineering, radiation
protection, and many other areas of nuclear power
plant operations. To be effective, any changes need
to minimize the risk of extreme disasters. Unfortu-
nately, given the shortage of data, it is too early to
judge if the risk of events has significantly improved
post-Fukushima. We can only raise attention to
the fact that similar sweeping regime changes after
both Chernobyl (leading to a decrease in frequency)
and Three Mile Island (leading to a suppression of
moderate events) failed to mitigate the very heavy
tailed distribution of costs documented here.
A separate conclusion of our article concerns the
nature of data about nuclear incidents and accidents.
We found that the INES scale of the IAEA is highly
inconsistent, and the scores provided by the IAEA
incomplete. For instance, only 50% of the events in
our database have INES scores. Further, for the costs
to be consistent with the INES scores, the Chernobyl
and Fukushima disasters would need to be between
an INES level of 10 and 11, rather than the maximum
level of 7. The INES scale was compared to the an-
tiquated Mercalli scale for earthquake magnitudes,
which was replaced by the continuous physically-
based Richter scale. Clearly, an objective continuous
scale such as the NAMS would be superior to the
INES. However, while using INES, scores should
be made available for all accidents. When such a
framework is established, and data on incidents
and accidents made more rigorous and transparent,
accident risks can be better understood, and perhaps
even minimized through positive learning.
Finally, our study opens a number of avenues for
future research. Our results have been obtained for
the current fleet, dominated in large part by Gener-
ation II reactors. Future research directions could be
to investigate how much of the specific risks for each
reactor type or design can be inferred from statistical
analysis, with the goal of identifying which of the
reactors are the safest. In addition to the role of tech-
nology, another natural extension would be to corre-
late accidents to the type of market or form of regula-
tory governance, restructured versus monopoly/state
run, or limited liability versus no limited liability.
Speaking in comparative terms, our focus on
the risks of civil nuclear power plants might give
the impression that this technology is riskier than
other competing technologies, such as coal or wind
energy. However, due to the more diluted nature
of the costs, and the quasi-hysteric focus on nuclear
risks following the Fukushima disaster, an insidious
villain may be hidden: it has been estimated that fine
particle air pollution causes about 7 million prema-
ture deaths globally each year, including more than
1 million in China, and about 60,000 in Europe. Con-
sidering the value of life to be in the millions (106),
these deaths alone account for a cost on the order of
a trillion USD (1012), not taking into consideration
the billions also being required for healthcare. Coal,
whose global use has soared by 50% from 2000 to
2010, is the leading source of fine particles, which are
embedded in the lungs, causing cancers. Between
2010 and 2012, European coal consumption jumped
5%, or 50 million tons. Thus, performing a rigorous
empirically-based comparative analysis of the risks
of nuclear versus other forms of energy providers is
absolutely essential to avoid falling in the traps of
media hypes and availability biases, in the goal of a
better steering of our societies. Furthermore, such
an analysis should, on one hand, take into consid-
eration the costs of the disposal of nuclear wastes,
while on the other hand recognize that humankind
is confronted with a “nuclear stewardship curse,”
whereby existing nuclear byproducts/waste need to
be securely managed over immense time scales.(66)
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